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Security
Reqlyn 0.5.1 is not released yet. This help describes it ahead of release.
What Reqlyn keeps, where, what leaves your computer, how it is encrypted, and what it never does; and how to report a vulnerability. The design and its boundaries are in ARCHITECTURE.md; encrypted sync is in SYNC_SECURITY.md; each surface's threats are in THREAT_MODEL.md.
What leaves your computer
Reqlyn runs on your computer, or on a server you run. There is no Reqlyn cloud, no account with us, and no telemetry. What leaves your computer is only:
- The requests you send, to the addresses they name, with the credential each names, and that credential only to the origins you allowed it.
- Sync, when you turn it on: definitions sealed with your workspace key (XChaCha20-Poly1305) to your own server or a folder you choose; the server or the folder cannot read them. No secret is ever synced: each device keeps its own.
- Your server, when you link one: what you publish to it, the runs you ask of it, and your sign-in. It is yours, not ours.
- Claude assistance, when you turn it on with your own key: a task's shape, never a value or a host, shown to you before it goes.
- Feedback and crash reports, only when you press Send: what you write, Reqlyn's version and the operating system; a crash report says where Reqlyn stopped, never what it was doing. Settings offers each; nothing goes by itself.
- Your Converged Innovations account, when you sign in (Settings, Account, or
reqlyn account sign-in): your sign-in at account.convergedinnovations.com, this computer's registration (its name, its platform and a public key it makes), and the license's checks. Never a request, a definition or a secret. - Checking for an update: only a server you run does, when its operator sets a release feed; the desktop asks that server, not us.
Encryption and keys
- On your computer, every secret is in the operating system's store (Windows Credential Manager, the macOS Keychain, the Secret Service on Linux), never in Reqlyn's own files.
- On a server, secrets are sealed with AES-256-GCM under keys of their own, themselves sealed under the installation key, a file outside the database. Runs' kept bodies are sealed one per file. See KEY_RECOVERY.md.
- Sync seals each definition with the workspace key, which only approved devices and your recovery kit hold; a removed device is cut off by re-keying. See SYNC_SECURITY.md.
- Packages and plugins are signed with Ed25519 by their publisher and installed only from a key you trust; Reqlyn's curated packs are signed with the Reqlyn curated key.
- Service tokens are random, kept only as hashes, shown once, and expire after 90 days unless the administrator asks otherwise.
Secrets on your computer
- Credentials, secret variables, client certificates' private keys, the recording authority, publisher keys, a server token and the workspace key are kept in the operating system's secret store, and nowhere else. If the store cannot keep a secret, nothing is saved; nothing falls back to plain text. Where no store can be reached at all, as in the CI image, a secret variable's value is read from the process's
REQLYN_SECRET_<NAME>, which the pipeline gives from its own secrets; it is never written anywhere (Reqlyn in CI). - A request names its credential; the secret is read only when the request is sent, and marked sensitive to the HTTP client.
- History, exports, the mirror folder, connector packages, Arazzo documents and snippets never hold a secret value. A header that carried one is listed with "Value not kept".
- Imports mask likely secrets, cookies and authorization headers as the file is read. Regression cases and saved examples are masked before they are stored. Masking matches known values and secret-looking names; a secret an API transforms before echoing it is not recognized, and a response that echoes your token holds it like any other body.
What Reqlyn never does
- It never runs imported curl, a script or an expression: curl is parsed, conditions are structured comparisons with a fixed cost, and nothing in a file is executed.
- It never follows a redirect, so a credential goes only to the origin you sent it to.
- It never sends a credential to an origin you have not allowed it: a request from a package, a shared or synced request, a Git pull or a coding agent that would send one elsewhere waits for "Allow and send".
- It never uses the operating system's or the environment's proxy settings without being told.
- It never sends a write again by itself: a request that writes is not retried, not resumed without your confirmation, and a run interrupted under way is not replayed.
- It never undoes anything by itself: an undo is sent when a person chooses it.
- It never fetches what a document points to: descriptions are read from files beside it.
- It never sends a credential or a secret variable where a description alone chose: negative cases that would carry one say where it would go and wait for
--with-credentials. - It never shows a secret it has stored.
On a server
- Secrets are sealed with AES-256-GCM under keys of their own, which are sealed under the installation key. The key is a file outside the database: a database backup alone opens nothing. See KEY_RECOVERY.md.
- Where runs may send is the operator's to say (
REQLYN_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS). A host's resolved addresses are checked too, a message broker's included: the server's own networks are refused unless allowed, and a cloud's metadata address always is. - Where a credential may go is the binding's to say: one to twenty origins, set by an administrator, checked before its secret is read.
- Roles are checked by the server on every request, and taken away at once. Service tokens and people can be limited to named operations and environments. A second person approves activations where the manifest asks and remediation plans; a service token never approves.
- Tokens are high-entropy and kept as hashes, shown once. A service token is sent only over HTTPS, or to a server on the same computer.
- Runs keep events with no header and no body. Bodies are kept only where an operation or its hosting says so, masked for the secrets the run used and the fields it never keeps, each sealed in its own file, and removed after their time.
- The audit trail records every change with no secret, token, input or body, as a hash chain whose head the operator keeps elsewhere.
- The public portal shows only the versions an administrator marked public, each made from its schemas: no recorded example, no publisher, no environment. Every other route needs a token or a session. A portal's own domain is one the operator allows; on it only the portal answers, under a policy that runs no script but its own search's and sets no cookie; its counts keep no address, browser or query.
- MCP offers no tool that takes an address, and offers a version that writes only once an administrator allows it.
- Callbacks go to one-time addresses with their token kept hashed, optionally signed with an HMAC.
- Agents connect out over mutual TLS, with a token accepted only from the certificate made for that agent, and are given only the credentials each run names.
Claude assistance
Off until a person, or a workspace's administrator, turns it on with their own key. Only a task's shape is sent (methods, path templates, field names and kinds, what flows where), never a value or a host. You see the question before it goes, and nothing suggested is applied by itself. A draft asked for from a request sends that request and the API description's shape: operation ids, methods, paths, parameter and field names and kinds, never an example, a server or the description's prose; what is drafted is saved for you to review, and nothing is run. A workspace's administrator may have it ask a model at an OpenAI-compatible endpoint in place of Anthropic's: an https address, or one on the server's own computer, never plain http elsewhere, as the workspace's key goes there. Asked why a run failed, the server sends the run's record as you see it, every secret masked, with the workflow's Arazzo source and its descriptions' shape, and, for a workflow that keeps bodies, the failed response as it was kept, masked and cut at 4 KiB; a fix it proposes is a new draft, reviewed before anything runs.
Packages
The packages are not signed yet: check each by its SHA-256 (see INSTALL.md).
Reporting a vulnerability
Write to security@ on the product site's domain (the address is given here when the site is published). Say what you found, how to reproduce it, and what it lets someone do. Please give us 90 days to fix it before you tell anyone else; we will say within five working days that we have it, keep you told as we work, and credit you in the release notes unless you would rather not be named. Testing against your own installation is welcome; please do not test against anyone else's server or data.
Help for Reqlyn 0.5.1. All help topics